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Introduction
The concept and practice of offender rehabilitation has under
gone a variety of interesting transformations over the span of several
decades. Though a topic whose history dates back to the very
inception of the penitentiary system in America, the problem posed by
criminal behavior has not changed: can the state help to transform
individuals into law abiding citizens (Hirsch, A., 1992; Rothman, D.
1990)? Rehabilitation, a term originally defined by more overtly
religious connotations, has gone through a variety of re-
conceptualizations, and currently remains a concept without a clear or
specific definition that all or most practitioners can agree (Ward, T.,
Maruna, S., 2007).
Generally speaking, the practice of offender “rehabilitation”
regardless of it’s various manifestations and theoretical derivations
consists of two identifiable frames of reference.  The first one, and
perhaps the one that presently seems to garner the most support from
practitioners, researchers and theorists alike, may be most easily
identified as the risk perspective (Kratcoski, P. 2004; Van Voorhis, P.,
Cullen, F., Applegate, B., 2004). Central to this frame of reference isJournal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Shadow of correctional practice
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the idea that offending behavior is largely a product of irrational
thinking patterns that must first be controlled and then transformed in
the interest of the greater social good (The book Clockwork Orange
comes to mind). Within this context, the definitional parameters of the
criminal offense become analogous to the definitional parameters of
individual existence, making it impossible to differentiate between the
criminal act and the individual involved in this behavior.  Once human
possibility has been so reduced, the individual identity of the offender
is erased, leaving only a set of aggregated behaviors or variables to be
counted and maintained.
In opposition to the risk assessment model of rehabilitation is
the more traditionally therapeutic model of offender treatment.
Generally speaking, such an approach seeks to focus on the needs of
the offender, not as a set of risky behaviors or thoughts that need to
be controlled and maintained, but as a human being who has been
damaged by a variety of overlapping constitutive structural systems
that have resulted in the criminal act for which the individual is now
charged.  Though this more traditionally psychotherapeutic perspective
is able to recognize the role played by the individual in the criminal
act, it refuses to construct that behavior as the sole factor determining
who the criminally inclined individual actually is. Such distinctions areJournal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Shadow of correctional practice
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essential to the practice of offender rehabilitation and to our
understanding what may be termed the phenomenology of desistance.
(My conversation with Shadd Maruna took place over a period of
approximately nine months via e-mail correspondence.  During that
time, we explored a variety of ideas and philosophical formulations
concerning the practice of offender rehabilitation, the phenomenology
of desistance, the social construction of the offender, Agnew’s GST and
the interface between criminology, philosophy and psychology. We
explored the ways in which the social construction of the offender
evokes a variety of implications that constantly challenge the
offender’s ability to successfully re-enter society.  Perhaps most
important to this formulation is the way in which various structural
systems, be they located in the penitentiary proper or as represented
in a variety of social contexts, powerfully influence the process of re-
entry and often become the most challenging obstacle to the
successful completion of that process.
We start our conversation by focusing on Shadd’s important text,
Making Good: How Ex-Convicts Reform and Rebuild their Lives.)
Polizzi: I've started reading your book, Making Good: How Ex-
Convicts Reform and Rebuild Their Lives … Should I ask if you're read
Nietzsche?
Maruna: Well, you can ask… I actually have started reading a lot of
Nietzsche for my newer, post-Making Good research on punitiveness.
I’ve been quoting Nietzsche for years, especially: “Mistrust all in whom
the impulse to punish is powerful” and “Whoever fights with monsters
should take care that in the process he does not become a monster.”
(The guy was a king of one-liners – why don’t more philosophers writeJournal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Shadow of correctional practice
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in bursts of one-line bits of wisdom like Nietzsche?) But, I must admit
I wasn’t reading him at the time of Making Good. Let me know the link
you see, though, as I’m currently writing something on redemption
that revisits some of the Making Good themes and combines them with
some of the findings from the punitiveness research, so Nietzsche
could fit right in!
Polizzi: I was thinking about a dialogue in Thus Spoke Zarathustra
(2005), where Zarathustra/ Nietzsche states that because you’re
capable of evil, do good.  This recognition of the human possibility for
evil is important and is an observation that is often lost or covered
over.  Evil is unfortunately an all too human potential that each of us is
capable of evoking. The possibility for evil is not an exclusive potential
of a certain group of individuals, but an existential fact of human
nature (May, 1983).  We become susceptible to this possibility when
we forget that the monster “out there” is merely a variation on what is
also possible for me.
Maruna: That’s it in a nutshell. This is precisely the issue that my new
work is coming down to: the labeling of others as deviant seems to
serve a key scapegoating function, whereby they assume blame for all
the problems of the rest of us. I have a paper I am working on aboutJournal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Shadow of correctional practice
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the psychopathy diagnosis as an example of this. If you read the
psychopathy literature it is amazing how many of the characteristics of
so-called psychopaths sound suspiciously like contemporary society
(they are motivated purely by selfish interests, they want only money
and power, they don’t care about others, they seem charming and
warm, but underneath they are pure rational calculators seeking to rip
us off). I am sure that there are people who are like this. I have met
plenty of them. Yet, one can’t help but see our obsession with
psychopaths as a kind of scream for help from our individualistic,
market society. We are so frightened by the cold commodification of
everything around us, that we project these fears onto a scapegoat
figure of the psychopath.
Polizzi: Yes, the key thing is the person doing the labeling. The
labeler’s position -- as prison superintendent, case manager,
correctional officer or psychotherapist -- seems to provide a degree of
psychological protection against any specific vulnerably to a sudden
flash of conscience.
Maruna: True, although I have a lot of empathy for those doing this
type of work (as I know you do as well). Working every day with, for
instance, people who have committed sexual offences against children
and finding the people who did these things (inevitably) to beJournal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Shadow of correctional practice
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recognizably human does put an individual in a vulnerable position. To
me, this makes the kind of obsession with pathologizing one sees in
that profession completely understandable as a form of self-protection.
Working in prisons and jails is such an unnatural occupation (keeping
others incapacitated against their will) that it almost requires the "us
and them" neutralization to get through the day.
(Our conversation moves to a reflection on Jung’s concept of the
Shadow.  Jung’s formulation of the Shadow Archetype is perhaps the
most troubling within this theoretical perspective. Sanford defines this
concept as follows:
The term “the Shadow,” as a psychological concept, refers to
the dark, feared, unwanted side of our personality.  In
developing a conscious personality we all seek to embody in
ourselves a certain image of what we want to be like.  Those
qualities that could have become part of this conscious
personality, but are not in accord with the person we want to be,
are rejected and constitute the shadow personality.
(Sanford, 1987, p. 49)
The image of the offender, marginalized social group or adversarial
nation becomes the recipient of these “shadow projections,” and splitsJournal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Shadow of correctional practice
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our ability to recognize the possibility of evil in ourselves.  When we
construct the offender as the exclusive receptacle of evil and antisocial
behavior, we deny those same possibilities in ourselves and act as if
we are above moral reproach.)
Polizzi: Absolutely. This discussion reminds me of our shared interest
in Jung’s (1969) concept of the “shadow”, which I discussed in a
presentation I gave at ASC titled, “Social Presence and the Criminal
Body: A Phenomenological Perspective” (ASC Annual Meeting,
November, 2009, Philadelphia, PA). The “criminal” comes to represent
a shadow reflection of the social body that is perceived as separate
and therefore foreign and dangerous.  I think Arrigo and Williams’
(2009a) conceptualization of the shadow/ stranger dyad reflects Jung’s
description and make-up of the shadow rather well. The shadow
reflects all that the body politic must deny relative to the recognition of
its own deviance or moral irresponsibility; while the stranger is the
image that emerges from this dangerous split.
Arrigo and Williams’ (2009a) description also evokes for me the
image of Levinas and his contention that the other must be configured
as ontologically other (Levinas, 1969).  However, I am inclined to
agree with Derrida, at least on this point (Critchley, 1992) that the
conceptualization of otherness as ontologically other may not evokeJournal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Shadow of correctional practice
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the type of ethical call or response Levinas intends by this formulation.
(Levinas, 1969) By constructing the other in this way, the face-to-face
encounter may call forth the very same “foreignness” that allows for
the continued de-valuation of the other (Polizzi, 2007).The ability to
recognize difference does not need to evoke a sense of the stranger,
or “foreign” otherness, only another possibility for what it means to be
human. When I am confronted by the gaze of the other, the eyes
indeed speak and it is within that strange cadence that I may also
recognize myself (Levinas, 1969). I also think that this description fits
very well with much of what you discuss in your article in Deviant
Behavior, “Disowning our Shadow: a Psychoanalytic Approach to
Understanding Punitive Public Attitudes”. (Maruna, Matravers, King,
2004).
The danger of becoming what we most loath is actually the
danger that Jung identifies in his concept of the shadow.  My inability
to recognize and own my capacity for evil almost guarantees that I will
always see it reflected in the actions of others. Such a one sided
recognition of the presence of evil helps to inflate my own sense of
moral certainty, my own sense of moral infallibility, which in turn
justifies every immoral action I perform in the name of the Good and
places my actions beyond moral reproach. I am also reminded of
Neumann"s (1969) distinction between living in sin and living with sin.Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Shadow of correctional practice
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To live with sin demands that we recognize our own potential for evil,
and come to understand the psychological implications of such a
stance and not simply the convenient ability to recognize this
possibility in other individuals or groups. To live in sin is to remain
blind, unconscious and to ultimately become the monster that we seek
to destroy. (Neumann, 1969)
I think this can be witnessed at the macro-social level to which
you eluded concerning the social attitudes toward punishment and at
the micro level concerning the way in which offenders are often
treated by those who are responsible for their care. All too often, I
have witnessed colleagues treat or discuss their clients poorly without
any real recognition or awareness of the implications of such behavior.
Their position as superintendent, case manager, correctional officer or
psychotherapist seems to provide a degree of psychological protection
against any specific vulnerably to a sudden flash of conscience.  These
individuals are ontologically other and therefore my actions remain
justified. (I see this as a reversal of Levinas’s contention that it is the
otherness of the other that calls me to moral action; the more foreign
the other remains, the more likely that his or her call will be ignored.)
When we look into the eyes of the offender sitting across from me, it is
essential that I do not see my own reflection in their gaze or else I'm
doomed.  When such recognition can no longer be denied, I am leftJournal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Shadow of correctional practice
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with two options, embrace my own shadow, my own humanity or
punish that which has forced upon me this unwanted awareness of
self.  The way in which this moment is negotiated is essential to both
participants in this encounter.
Too often it is forgotten or ignored that Jung's concept of the
shadow is not simply evil, but also represents an integrative possibility
for a more conscious psychology. The shadow also reflects possibilities
of resilience and perseverance, which are also present. If we only
believe that the shadow exists “out there,” we remain hopelessly cutoff
from those parts of ourselves that remain actively, but indirectly
engaged in this process.  I particularly like the way in which you
describe these attitudes in the individuals you interviewed for Making
Good who though realistic about their situation, still seem determined
to live better and change their lives.  But such turns are nearly
impossible for these individuals when society continually demands that
they remain ontologically other, ontologically shadow.  The inability to
own our own shadow is powerfully witnessed in the punitive attitudes
you discuss in your article.
Maruna: I still think there is a goldmine in trying to understand where
our punitive attitudes come from and what they mean. My work in that
area, primarily with Anna King (Rutgers) has yet to materialize into aJournal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Shadow of correctional practice
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book, but I still think it is a crucial area for explaining where we
currently are with crime and justice in contemporary societies. It is not
that punitive attitudes themselves are driving the sorts of punitive
policies and practices we see in criminal justice (like locking up 2
million Americans), but rather like David Garland put it, the educated
public is like the “dog that didn’t bark” during this insane prison build
up. Where were we? Why did we let it happen? The same sort of
questions will be asked of us (indeed, already are asked of Americans
in most other parts of the world, where prison numbers are nowhere
near as high) as are asked of ordinary German citizens at the time of
the Holocaust or ordinary southerners in the antebellum South. Not
that the citizens drove the policies, but why did they tolerate them?
Polizzi: I am also interested in how you have drawn on McAdams’
very philosophical work in psychology. According to McAdams's theory
of the life story identity, adults create a personal myth by which to
provide a unified frame of reference by which to understand their
experience; this concept is very similar to Bob Agnew's description of
storylines, which it could be argued, also represents the construction
of a personal myth by which to understand their experience of criminal
behavior. I will soon be publishing an article (International Journal of
Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology) titled, Agnew's Strain
Theory Reconsidered: A Phenomenological Perspective, which wasJournal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Shadow of correctional practice
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directly influenced by Agnew's storylines article.  I have always seen
General Strain Theory as a constructionist social psychological
treatment of criminal behavior.  It seems much better suited
philosophically to a perspective like phenomenology or narrative work
because its fundamental focus is upon the way in which the perception
of negative experiences helps to influence subsequent criminal
behavior.  I think the concept of desistance is also well served by a
phenomenological grounding of this process.
Maruna: I was/am a student of Dan McAdams at Northwestern, and I
never cease to be amazed at how many of the big ideas that I think of
as being my own really keep coming back to ideas that I learned from
McAdams and my other Northwestern supervisor Dan A. Lewis fifteen
or twenty years ago. It is scary, but if I went back to the notes I
scribbled from those years I spent at Northwestern chatting to the two
of them, I’m sure someone could put together, not just the outline to
Making Good, but indeed to bones of the seven or eight other big
thoughts I’ve had from neutralizations, to the Jack Roller work, to my
stuff on punitiveness in the years since. It all happened in those
discussions. I guess that is what education is. I just hope my own
students get the same level of good stuff that I got from them.Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Shadow of correctional practice
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In regards to strain theory, I was awfully pleased to see Agnew’s
article on storylines appear. It has lit a fire under a number of us who
have been doing narrative work for some time now. Because Agnew is
such a legend in sociological criminology, he adds a real sense of
credibility for young criminologists who were never sure if this
narrative identity business wasn’t just some new age nonsense
dreamed up in touchy-feely psychology units. Now it is legitimate to
talk about self-stories if folks like Agnew even believe they are real.
Polizzi: Ha, yes! Narrative theory probably was dreamed up in
touchy-feely psychology units in the States, true.  Regardless its actual
paternity, though, your point is well taken and your observation
concerning the relationship between desistance and identity, if I may,
is spot on. In Making Good, you write: "Therefore, I argue that to
desist from crime, ex-offenders need to develop a coherent prosocial
identity for themselves" (Maruna, 2001, p. 8). I think you are
absolutely right; however, I do believe that this newly emerging
identity can reflect certain qualities that perhaps will not be viewed as
universally “prosocial” by all segments of a given society or culture.
Let me explain.
The notion of a coherent “prosocial” identity seems to smack of a
Durkheimian structuralism that is somewhat untenable for overlyJournal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Shadow of correctional practice
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heterogeneous cultures. Such an identity may come to be viewed by
certain segments of society as being “prosocial,” insofar as this
identity reflects an image of resistance toward these larger socially
oppressive dynamics and structures. Malcolm X comes immediately to
mind, though many other examples exist. It is certainly possible for an
individual to develop a coherent social identity that rejects the
psychological artifacts of an oppressive social structure. Durkheim's
(1951) belief that deviance is evidenced by the absence of the
sufficient internalization of social norms in the individual is hardly
exhaustive of this process. It could just as easily be argued that
deviance is representative of an over abundance of these very same
internalized cultural values, which include the continued
marginalization of the poor, racism, sexism, etc., which in turn results
in the manifestation of criminal behavior Within this context, criminal
behavior comes to represent a strategy of resistance. It is also
important to note that resistance is also a prosocial stance that refuses
to accept the imposed values of a deviant social structure.
Maruna: This is a really important point David, and it gets right to the
heart of Making Good. I sometimes do see the book as falling in a
Durkheimian tradition. One of my major influences, after all, has been
John Braithwaite anyhow, and he was once dubbed “The New
Durkheim.” But, you are precisely right that Durkheim has far too rosyJournal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Shadow of correctional practice
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a picture of contemporary society, and there is no way that I would
characterize the Liverpool narratives as being “prosocial” in
Durkheimian terms (indeed, that was a very poor word choice on my
part).
As you will have read if you made it to the last chapters of the
book, the “prosocial” narratives of interviewees remain highly critical
of mainstream culture (have you ever been to Liverpool, by the way?).
They do indeed characterize parts of their involvement (certainly the
origins of this involvement) in crime and drugs as being a sort of
resistance to the mainstream, and they find a sort of consistency in
their current (crime and drug-free) lives by arguing that they remain
“rebels” still. Even though they are “going straight,” they continue to
see themselves as very much fighting the powers that be. They are
just using a different (perhaps “better”) strategy for this resistance. In
some ways, the strategy they are using is “prosocial” (by my definition
at least). In that, I think what they are doing is what every good
citizen should be doing (thinking for themselves, fighting injustice
when they see it, contributing to the betterment of the society as they
see it), but of course they come across considerable resistance in
these efforts by the powers that be. So you are right, there is a more
interesting story here than the familiar one of “I used to be on the ‘bad
side’, now I’ve seen the light and want to join the ‘good side’”.Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Shadow of correctional practice
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If I can defend the notion of “prosocial” it is this: A key challenge
for all of the interviewees in the study was to prove to the world
around them that they’d changed, and in order to do this, they needed
a narrative that conformed to some of the rules of conversion
narratives like the one I dismiss above. That is, they need – and
Malcom X needed -- a story that “sells” at some level. They can remain
rebels, but they have to explain how the continuity of this rebellion is
now consistent with a radical change in behavior. Malcolm did that,
while maintaining his strong critique of mainstream culture, and his
text has become a sort of script for countless others who seek to
desist with dignity.
Another model for this is the IRA (Irish Republican Army) and
their shift from armed violence to purely pacifist means through the
political party Sinn Fein. The former armed combatants have not
changed their politics or their views about the role of the British state
in Ireland. They have however put down their guns and made an
enormous change in behavior to what some would see as “prosocial”
strategies for rebellion and social critique. The average prisoner is no
Martin McGuinness and certainly no Malcolm X, but their task is much
the same – maintaining continuity and pride, while changing one’s life.Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Shadow of correctional practice
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Polizzi: Having worked clinically with offender populations for nearly
fifteen years, it is very clear that your observation reflects the goal
which many of these men and women have attempted to achieve. The
process of reconstruction which you describe seems to take place
within two specific contexts. The first reflects the way in which their
current life story can be rewritten or rearranged so as to provide for a
different set of possibilities or future. However, these are personal
histories that do not necessarily address the overriding social context
from which these stories emerge.
My own dissertation explored the phenomenology of anti-black
racism as witnessed in the Autobiography of Malcolm X (Polizzi, 2003).
Malcolm continually reconstructs himself throughout the Autobiography
through the use of a variety of ready-to-hand social narratives which
reflect a very specific phenomenological engagement to his world.
Though Malcolm was clearly able to develop a coherent narrative,
albeit continually evolving, by which to understand and make sense of
his existence, the obvious fact of racism still remained. His various
transformations reflected this ever evolving way of being-in-the-world,
his ever evolving identity and its struggle with what I call the racist
“they-self.”Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Shadow of correctional practice
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However, this relationship to the “they-self” is always
multilayered, insofar as being-in-the-world is often engaged with a
variety of competing meanings for existence. (Polizzi, 2003, 2010a,
2010b) The multilayered presencing of the “they-self” is clearly
witnessed in the way in which Malcolm’s evolving possibilities for
being-in-the-world as black are both liberated and confronted by these
competing meanings for black experience.  Malcolm’s narrative
becomes specifically meaningful through this engagement with this
multilayered they-self, which constantly seeks to provide being-in-the-
world the meaning and potentiality for its existence. The individual
involved in the criminal lifestyle is no different.  The possibility for
desistance emerges from this meaning generating process that on the
one hand attempts to restrict the meaning of being and capture it
within an exclusive formulation or construction of individual as criminal
while other potentialities for that same being are attempted to be
lived.
Maruna: What a great dissertation topic (Can you send me a copy?).
Yes, Malcolm X is the perfect example (and the book was a big
influence on me as a young person, probably bigger than I realize).
This is the second time in recent weeks someone has raised that
example too. I had the remarkable privilege of being a part of the
preconference workshop hosted by LIFERS, Inc. in Graterford PrisonJournal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Shadow of correctional practice
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before the American Society of Criminology meeting. I’m sure you
know them, but if not check out:
http://www.insideoutcenter.org/PDF_articles/InsideOut_LifersPublicSaf
ety.pdf
Anyhow, the LIFERS spoke in depth about Malcolm X’s influence
– not in regards to his allegiance to Nation of Islam, but purely as a
role model for them as prisoners who are transforming their lives
through an intellectual journey, through a better understanding of
their histories – their own life histories, but more importantly history
through a social and contextualized lens as you say. They are trying to
understand history itself in order to understand themselves, and they
are changing history too. So they are the perfect examples of the
journey described in Making Good – except for the fact that because of
the draconian laws of Pennsylvania, they will never be released from
prison. This role of history in the transformation of future behaviours is
hinted at obliquely in Making Good, but it is something I very much am
trying to develop for this new book I am writing about redemption in
society, more generally. (So, send me that dissertation of yours)
(David Polizzi worked for three years as a psychological intern and
then as a full-time employee, providing ongoing psychotherapy toJournal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Shadow of correctional practice
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inmates incarcerated within the Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections)
Polizzi: Having worked in the Pennsylvania system for approximately
three years, I have certainly witnessed firsthand the results of this
draconian legal process.  I would only add that the Pennsylvania
system holds the dubious distinction of having the largest number of
inmates between the ages of seventeen to twenty one serving life
without parole in the nation. The current number is approximately 515
inmates.
Offenders, at least in the States, must confront very much the
same struggle. The fact that one is never allowed to truly be
something other the convict, makes this transition very difficult to
achieve. Many of my clients have struggled with this very real
existential question. For example, it can become very difficult for
some to accept that they will continue to be seen by loved ones or
society as a thief, criminal, drug addict, etc, regardless the degree to
which they have been able to actually transform their lives. Such
realities often force the individual to explore the meaning of their
existence, regardless the way in which it will be viewed by
others. Though it may indeed be true that the unexamined life is not
worth living, the serious examination of one’s existence can often leadJournal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Shadow of correctional practice
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to the same conclusion. As a result, some individuals do indeed fail. It
is at often easier to resort to the web of chronic drug use then to try to
live without substances. "Why should I get clean when no one will
believe that I'm actually going to stop using?"
Maruna: Absolutely. Most readers concentrate on the happier stories
in Making Good regarding desistance, and that was of course my
intention. Yet, the “condemnation script” scenario I identified with the
persistent offenders I interviewed (these were former prisoners living
in the community who were willing to disclose that they were still
involved with crime and had no intentions to cease this involvement in
the short-term). When I talk about the sort of hopelessness that
characterized these self-narratives, sometimes this is misunderstood
as meaning they were sad and pathetic, “poor me” stories.
Occasionally this was true, but hopelessness does not always manifest
itself in depression-like states. With males, in particular, more often
than not, this defeat was expressed as more of a “to hell with it”
attitude. As Sykes and Matza put it, “If you’re going to reject me, then
you know what? I’m going to reject you too.” This might manifest itself
in what looks like a never-ending party – and it can be a kick to
engage in this sort of nihilism – but that does not mean that
underneath that exterior is not that same sense of internalized
condemnation and humiliation.Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Shadow of correctional practice
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Polizzi: I think the difficulty in defining desistance is in part due to the
lack of understanding concerning the way in which this result is
achieved by the individual(s).  There often is very little discussion of
the lived-meaning this possibility has for the individual and almost no
serious discussion concerning the way in which social context helps to
influence this decision or actually restrict or prevent it from ever
occurring.  One of your interviewees states this problem very nicely
when he states:
Well, whenever you're in prison you see the light so to speak.
"Oh, I'm never going back." So I was all that, "Oh, I'm never
going back," and I done well for a while.  I managed to get a job
and stuff, but things started going back to the old routine.
(Maruna, 2001, p. 23).
It is very easy to deny the realities of another social context,
when you are not currently facing it on a daily basis. The ability for
this new intention to materialize is directly related to the context to
which the individual returns.  Desistance must not be seen as an
academic concept but as a possibility, one of many possibilities that
exist within the lived-experience of a specific social context. Because
the possibility for desistance remains inseparably joined with any
number of competing possibilities for existence, both must be takenJournal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Shadow of correctional practice
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into account.  How does the individual define from their perspective,
their involvement in the criminal life style or their involvement in
drugs? What do these experiences provide the individual and how are
they viewed by the larger social surround to which the individual
belongs?  Simply to say, for example, that the gang lifestyle is
deviant, misses many of the most important aspects of this
experience. What does the life style provide that is not specifically
criminal in nature?
What is needed is a phenomenology of desistance, which would
better situate the meaning of this experience for the individual and
would also be better able to capture the influence or strains that make
this possibility difficult to achieve.  I think Making Good, does explore
the phenomenology of desistance in a very explicit way and more
importantly, brings into clear view the real humanity of those
individuals attempting to better their lives; this in fact may be the
most important reason for pursuing a phenomenology of desistance.
But, of course, this is not easy. You really get to the heart of this
problem when you state that:
The challenge facing phenomenological researchers, of course, is
that subjectivity is by its nature rather messy.  Abstract concepts
such as identity and the self are difficult for researchers to reliablyJournal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Shadow of correctional practice
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study, and when they do, their findings are equally difficult for
readers to interpret and evaluate (Maruna, 2001, p. 37-38).
However, for me, this statement reflects the shadow of the
discipline of criminology specifically and the social sciences generally
and evokes its need for Cartesian certainty.  Measurement does not
precede existence; “I measure therefore I am” is not an appropriate
theorem for the study of human existence. (Giorgi, 1970) The problem
is with the method and the unexplored assumptions of that method,
not with the data.  Phenomenological research seems messy, seems
less scientifically certain because existence is messy.  The rejection of
positivism as an appropriate theoretical perspective for the study of
the human sciences (social sciences) demands a rejection of
quantification as well; at least as it is currently viewed within the
discipline.  Method should never determine what the data has to say
and method should never be seen as a theory.  Ultimately, method is
nothing more than a specific epistemological tool used to reveal a
certain set of preconceived a priori truths concerning a specific
phenomenon.  If we are to humanize the way in which we theorize
about crime, we must also humanize the methods employed to bring
forth the understanding we seek.Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Shadow of correctional practice
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Maruna: Yes, criminology’s shadow – I love it. You are right that the
narrowing of method over the last three or four decades has really put
blinkers on the field and reduced the scope of what we see. The result
is that we miss some obvious things about what makes human beings
tick (which is what we are getting paid to understand). The example I
always give is this: Who commits the most crime? Young men between
16 and 25. What do young men of that age think about 95 percent of
the time? Having sex. Yet, when is the last time sexual desire was
mentioned in Journal of Quantitative Criminology? I haven’t kept up
with the last few issues, but I bet if you did an archive search, you
wouldn’t find many mentions of masturbation, fantasy, sexual
confusion, experimentation with homosexuality, shame of virginity,
desperation -- any of the things that are so profoundly influential in
the lives of young males. How do we miss something that is so
consuming in the lives of the people we are studying? Maybe sexuality
has nothing to do with crime and violence, although I doubt that (and
you’d think we would want some good evidence to prove this null
hypothesis before dismissing such a substantial part of our subjects’
lives). More likely, it is because we aren’t looking with our eyes wide
open, we aren’t listening; we are not getting to know and trying to get
inside the skin of our research “subjects” like we should be, but rather
corralling them into narrow boxes of our own choosing. Like you say,Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Shadow of correctional practice
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our approach is, “It is measurable, therefore it is." And if it ain’t
measurable, it ain’t there. So, if sexuality (or other aspects of lived
human experience) are too messy to measure, then we stick to what
we can count. I am not opposed to quantification, by any means. I
strongly support quant tools, I even published a chapter in the
Handbook of Quantitative Criminology (2010), but I am opposed to the
fetishization of quant methods and to any understanding of social
science that excludes other ways of knowing and learning (which I say
in that Handbook chapter too). That is just embarrassingly misguided
and so dangerous for the future health of the field.
Polizzi: Agreed. Let me get back to the phenomenology of desistance,
for a moment.  Studying desistance and the phenomenology of
desistance are really two different conceptualizations of the same topic
taken from two slightly different theoretical frames of reference.
Desistance is the cessation of criminal behavior simply as a matter of
fact:  has this person decided to cease their involvement in the
criminal lifestyle or not? The phenomenology of desistance is much
more focused on the contours by which this process unfolds and the
meaning provided to it by each perceiving consciousness.
Though I’m alluding to Husserl, I’m really thinking about
Heidegger and his concept of Thrownness.  Desistance, seenJournal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Shadow of correctional practice
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phenomenologically, represents that confluence between being-in-the-
world and its relationship or grounding within a very specific type of
“thrown” existence.  The desire to desist, the ability to make the
existential choice to cease one’s criminal activity, presupposes that
one’s thrown reality is not so restricted so as to make this choice
almost impossible to bring into being.  I think this idea is reflected in
Arrigo’s concept of penal harm, (2009b) which recognizes the way in
which the criminal body is overwhelmed and taken over by the
constructing gaze of the criminal justice system and reduces it to an
artifact of that process.
What I like about your work on desistance is that it reintroduces
the human dimension into this conversation. The possibility for
legitimate reintegration is really predicated upon the way in which this
problem is contextualized and constructed.  If we stay within the
confines of Arrigo’s concept of penal harm, reintegration is impossible
because the total process failures in an essential way: it continues to
fail to recognize the fundamental humanity of the individual offender.
From this theoretical vantage, it really becomes irrelevant whether the
specific conversation is focused on restorative strategies or processes
of rehabilitation; we are still talking about an artifact, a cause that
needs to be controlled by the system.Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Shadow of correctional practice
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The phenomenology of desistance, which your work nicely
illustrates, recognizes first and foremost the humanity of the individual
who is involved with their own unique experience of reintegrating
within the larger society.  Rather than representing a set of variables
or identifiable criminogenic factors, what is viewed is the human cost
of crime and the criminal lifestyle from the perspective of the offender.
How does one attempt to reintegrate when they are denied any
legitimate voice in this process?
Maruna: Yes, “desistance”, taken literally, is a behavioral term – or
actually just the absence of a behavior. On its own, desistance is not a
very interesting thing to watch (there’s nothing to see, so little to
study). So, when people talk about doing ethnographic studies of
desistance, they are really talking about watching people formerly
convicted of criminal offences going about their day-to-day lives doing
non-criminal things. Not much interesting about that (not that all of
our ordinary lives aren’t fascinating). Yet, there is something richer
implied in the term “phenomenology of desistance” about personal
transformations and social reconstructions of reality that I think has
captured the imagination of so many in and outside of academia. Just
as you imply, the topic almost immediately generates heavy
discussions about human agency, determinism, and the interplay
between social constructions and individual choice. These discussionsJournal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Shadow of correctional practice
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were taking place in regards to desistance long before my book on the
topic and other researchers have found them unavoidable, as much as
they complicate and cloud our analyses.
Polizzi: The phenomenology of desistance focuses not only on the fact
of whether or not this individual will reoffend, but how their experience
can become meaningfully engaged with the possibility for change from
the contextual reality they are currently living.  Too often the
possibility of reintegration and desistance from crime is overly focused
on the offender with little recognition of the way in which the
possibility for change is also greatly influenced by the contextual
realities of one’s existence.  This incongruent relationship between the
willingness to change and the ability to change is often ignored
resulting in a static configuration of the offender that remains
ontologically isolated and for ever caught within the construction of the
criminal.
Such a formulation reflects nicely with Jung’s concept of the
Shadow, which comes to represent the offender as the ontological
manifestation of danger, lawlessness and potential harm.  Within such
a configuration, the offender becomes the living manifestation of this
social evil, while at the same time allowing the social psyche from
owning the implications of its own Shadow projections.  TheJournal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Shadow of correctional practice
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phenomenology of the Shadow becomes a type of being-in-the-world
that has become deformed and restricted in its possibility to be as
others are allowed to be.  Within this context, reintegration must be
denied because to do otherwise would imply that the social body has
summoned up the courage to confront the psychological consequences
evoked by this unwillingness to embrace the Shadow.  Jung is very
clear on this point.  We either accept the implications of the Shadow
and integrate this possibility into our conscious awareness as
individuals and as a society, or we choose only to recognize it in the
actions of others who come to personify those manifestations of the
social body that are incompatible with the way in which society needs
to define itself.
Once these subject positions become firmly entrenched socially
and psychologically, reintegration becomes difficult indeed.  For the
offender, criminality becomes one of the few possibilities for being-in-
the-world and finds it difficult to configure a different way to be.  For
its part, society conveniently configures all of the manifestations of
social ill within the image of the offender who now becomes
responsible to bear the burden of this heavy weight.  The offender is
never really provided the opportunity for real change given that they
are forever marked with the sign of the Shadow and are required to
bear the totality of this social failure.  Society, by its rejection of theJournal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Shadow of correctional practice
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Shadow, always remains beyond moral approach because it is not it
that is flawed and in no way complicate with these criminal acts. In the
end, it leaves the whole of society living in sin as opposed to with it.
Maruna: This is it. You have really captured much better than I could
how I think the research I have done in recent years on punitiveness
and public attitudes (the shadow projection work) ties back in to the
desistance research. I see the two as very much inter-related. Over
the last ten years, since Making Good was first published, people have
frequently asked me to talk about my desistance work and I have
joked that I have desisted from desistance. Some seemed
disappointed that I wanted to talk about the psychology of
punitiveness rather than desistance, but in fact the two are deeply
related, and in many ways I have come full circle in my research (that
sounds better than ‘going in circles,’ at least) and come back to the
core ideas in Making Good – just from the other side of the redemption
coin. Or the other side of the shadow, maybe.
Polizzi: Incidentally, you may want to add that the Shadow is a
conceptualization from Analytic Psychology and not Psychoanalysis; we
old Jungians take some exception with Jung being lumped in with the
Psychoanalysts.  I have argued with former professors that Jung only
became a student of Freud, after he had already begun his own workJournal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Shadow of correctional practice
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on resistance and only after he had read Freud and believed that he
was on the some journey.
Since you know Durkheim pretty well, too, I always have
wondered this question.  Did Freud get his concept of the Super Ego,
in part from Durkheim who also places a great deal of significance on
the internalization of social norms and values?  Freud, I believe, would
have been in Paris studying with Genet around the time that Suicide
was published. Though I do believe that the architecture of Freud's
theory is superior to Durkheim, it does appear that Freud may owe
some credit to him for this idea.  I suppose it is equally possible that
differing examples of a social structuralist approach could come more
or less to the same conclusion, unrelated to each other...  You speak
about redemption; do you know the work of Murray Cox?
Maruna: I’m afraid my knowledge of the sociology of the social
theorists is too slim to be able to help you with the Freud/Durkheim
question, although my hunch is you are probably right. Yes, I
remember Murray Cox’s book Remorse and Reparation well, and am
drawing a lot on it in my new work. Cox’s death in the weeks before
the manuscript was finished was a real tragedy, but what a legacy.
The book, as I remember, started off with rather modest ambitions –
just an edited volume by a group of British forensic psychotherapists,Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Shadow of correctional practice
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seen it all before – but Cox’s asking for work on such a profound topic
as remorse and reparation really opened the door for some fascinating
discussions across a fantastic, international and interdisciplinary line
up of authors, many of them practitioners. I am not telling you
anything you don’t know as someone with so many years of
professional experience yourself, but there is something remarkable
about essays like the ones in that book, where practitioners like Cox
get a moment to reflect on what they do and why they do it.
After all, remorse is one of those issues that we instinctively
think we know everything we need to know about. In practice, judges,
juries, psychologists, and researchers all take for granted that
expressions of remorse are an indication of change and excuses and
denials are an indication that a person is not taking the first steps to
rehabilitation. But, Cox introduces that book with a remarkable
confession he says a colleague asked him, “Murray could you give me
a research reference on the relationship between the expression of
remorse and the diminished likelihood of re-offending?” and he did not
know the answer. “After 25 years in the field I surely ought to have
been able to do so ‘off the cuff’,” he writes, but he searched his files to
little avail. “It was to my great surprise (and partial chagrin) that such
references were scant, almost to the point of non-existence. … My
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specialist libraries, depending on appropriate databases, were only
slightly more productive. … Virtually all the experts, representing the
wide variety of disciplines…came up with the same reply.” The
emperor had no clothes.
It is the sort of eureka that makes the work we do so exciting.
To have the opportunity that Murray did – to be able to say, OK, we
don’t really know anything about remorse, so let’s commission all the
smart people I can think of from across different disciplines and
occupations, from distinguished California anthropologists to former
parole board members, to think deeply about the topic on paper – is
even more remarkable. And, the book is a triumph. Of course, it is not
the last word on remorse and reparation, but that is what makes it so
rich. So, now, the next time someone asks me “Can you send me a
quick reference that proves remorse predicts desistance,” I can say,
“Nope, I can’t do that, but I can send you a tremendous book that
proves that remorse and desistance are far more complicated than
that.”
Polizzi: Exactly. Speaking of things being “more complicated than
that,” I like that, in Making Good, you dispel this notion that ex-
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or failures.  The "grey area" that you discuss is the ground of human
existence, which is not reducible to methodically driven assumptions
about what it means to be criminal or human.  I like the notion of the
grey because it nicely critiques the false necessity (Unger, 1988) of
black/ white distinctions, which exist only because of methodological
bias.  The need to generalize data for the purpose of its subsequent
measurement must be overly generalized, if the method is ever to
deliver its false sense of Cartesian certainty.  Grey is too variable, too
unwilling to be easily reduced for later consumption.
I think this notion of the grey is the fundamental problem across
the social sciences; we must simply accept that our data is different
from the natural sciences and therefore demands a different approach
to the issue of human existence and possibility.  Gadd and Jefferson
(2007) make the same point in their book Psychosocial Criminology
when they critique the pursuit of a general theory of crime.  It is
simply impossible and ironically enough, the fanatical application of
measurement will actually take us farther from that goal.
Desistance is not a variable to be measured but is rather, a
different potentiality for being-in-the-world.  Throughout the criminal
justice process, one experiences the clash of competing they-selves.
The very meaning of this type of being-in-the-world is held in theJournal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Shadow of correctional practice
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balance.  The more traditional perspectives on desistance, in the end,
can only tally the scorecard of subsequent involvements in the criminal
lifestyle, which tells us virtually nothing about the meaning that this
behavior has for the individual.
I like what Katz (1988) does with his distinction between
humiliation and rage.  Humiliation is in relation to one's relationship to
a specific they, whereas rage or righteous rage becomes the way in
which being-in-the-world takes up this possibility. Mead (1967) is also
very close to this idea in his I/me configuration. As Heidegger would
say, there is no being without world, there is no articulation of human
possibility, authentic or otherwise, without a specific social context.
In your work, you argue that the act of desistance can very
much be an act of resistance to the restrictive demands of the
retributive “they-self” of the criminal justice system.  Within this
context, desistance represents a breaking away for being-in-the-world,
which refuses to be restricted by that which “the they-self” validates
and that which it does not.  Such a stance opens the way for another
adumbration of “the they-self” to appear, providing a different and
competing meaning for being.  This was exactly my point with Malcolm
X.  Malcolm is able to embrace a variety of competing meanings for
black-being-in-the-world that is able to transcend the limitations of
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hermeneutic destroys the calcified meanings for being and allows its
potential to be liberated.  This is not meant to imply that the
restrictive aspects of thrownness disappear and one skips off into the
happily ever after.  But it does allow for an opening of being that is
allowed to explore its own potentiality and perhaps be allowed to be
like others are allowed to be.
By the way, I have come across a recent article where you are
identified as a Yank...  Is this true?
Maruna: Ha. I am indeed a Yank – although maybe I am in a “grey
area” in terms of national identity myself. There was an article recently
on “important works of British criminology” and the authors had an
interesting discussion about how they would define and delineate what
would be included under this heading. Anyhow, they devoted a whole
footnote to Making Good – written by a Yank who works in Belfast,
based on research in Liverpool, but published by the American
Psychological Association for a US audience (complete with
translations from Scouse into American English) – as an example of
the boundaries of this notion. In the end, they decided it wasn’t
“British criminology” if I remember right. Plenty of Yanks wouldn’t
consider it “American criminology” either! It sort of falls in between
those cracks, as well as plenty of disciplinary cracks too. I teach in aJournal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Shadow of correctional practice
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law school, but am no lawyer. I suppose I am a criminologist, even
though I’ve never taken a single course in criminology/criminal justice.
Criminologists call me a psychologist, but no real psychologist would
accept me into their club. Anyhow, all these grey areas suit me just
fine, but maybe this is why I find myself so deeply opposed to labels
and labeling in regards to criminal justice.
It is also why I am so supportive of efforts like this journal to
introduce new concepts from philosophy, psychology and elsewhere
into the criminological discussion. I have learned a lot from all of our
exchanges. Your read of my book is probably smarter than the book
itself – my Heidegger is as rusty as my Husserl. Still, it goes to show
what new ideas can be generated in a dialogue like this one. I really
appreciate you giving me this chance and hope this little exchange is
of value for the journal.  All the best, Shadd
Polizzi:  Thank you Shadd, I really enjoyed thinking out loud with you.
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